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Descartes on Unknown Faculties and 
O ur Knowledge of the External World*
Lex Newman
Descartes introduces his skeptical arguments, in the First Medita­
tion, in an order o f  increasing strength. First, the narrator-medi- 
tator notices that judgm ents concerning the nature o f  small and  
distant objects are unreliable; later, that even sensory judgm ents  
about large and close objects are in doubt— this after considering  
an argum ent related to m adness and another related to dreaming; 
finally, that no judgm ents resist doubt— the renowned Deceiver Hy­
pothesis is introduced, a skeptical device in tended to underm ine  
not only the judgm ent that an external, corporeal world exists, but 
even the m ost certain judgm ents in m athem atics . 1
For each o f these skeptical problem s (with the exception o f the 
m adness w orry), Descartes provides an argum ent in the later (epis- 
tem ologically constructive) M editations that is its com plem ent. H e 
provides an argum ent that our sensory ideas o f  corporeal things 
do not resem ble the external objects that cause them  (regardless 
o f size and d istance); an argum ent in tended to solve the problem  
o f dreaming; another to prove the existence o f  the external, cor­
poreal world; and an argum ent to establish the veracity o f  ju d g­
m ents based on clear and distinct perception.
In this paper, I focus on the com plem entary pair that concerns 
the problem  o f  the existence o f the external, corporeal world. Ac­
cording to (what I shall call) the standard interpretation, the prob­
lem  is generated only by the strongest o f  the First M editation skep­
tical arguments, the Deceiver H ypothesis;2 it is then dismissed in
*1 am especially indebted to Alan Nelson for extensive criticism of ear­
lier drafts of this paper. I have also benefited from suggestions by Paul 
Hoffman, Nicholas Jolley, David Smith, Marleen Rozemond, Ermanno Ben- 
civenga, Albert Casullo, Mark van Roojen, and an anonymous referee for 
the Philosophical Review. And I received very useful criticisms in discussion 
of the paper in a Department of Philosophy Colloquium at the University 
of Nebraska, Lincoln.
lrThis account is not without its critics. For instance, in his “The Role 
of the Malignant Demon,” Studia Leibnitiana 8 (1976): 257-64, John (Not­
tingham argues that mathematical truths are not in fact questioned by the 
First Meditation arguments and that the Deceiver Hypothesis adds nothing 
new to the skeptical work of the earlier dreaming passage.
2It appears there are two principal reasons for the widespread view that
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the Sixth M editation by m eans o f  a straightforward undoing o f  the 
First M editation skeptical problem — corporeal substance must be 
the cause o f our sensory ideas, since God has been  shown to be 
no deceiver.
I want to challenge the standard interpretation and argue that 
Descartes has included another pair o f  com plem ents, a pair that 
takes center stage in his treatm ent o f  our knowledge o f  the exter­
nal, corporeal world. The skeptical part is a doubt raised in the 
m adness and dream ing passage o f the First Meditation: it questions 
the existence o f  the corporeal world by appeal to the possibility o f  
unknown, m ental faculties, an appeal that foreshadows Descartes’s 
theory o f  innate ideas. The epistem ologically constructive part oc­
curs as an essential step in the Sixth M editation proof o f  the ex­
istence o f the external, corporeal world: it is intended to rule out 
the possibility o f  unknown, m ental faculties by m eans o f  the trans­
parency doctrine o f the m ind— the thesis that there is nothing in 
the m ind o f which we are not aware.
In what follows, I begin with an exam ination o f the Sixth M ed­
itation argum ent, in order to clarify the unknown faculty worry 
and its prom inent role in Descartes’s treatm ent o f  the problem  
external, corporeal world. I begin here, since an understanding o f  
the Sixth M editation argum ent helps elucidate the First M editation  
skeptical worry it discharges. I then consider the First M editation  
account itself, defending my reading o f  the m adness and dream ing  
passage. And following this, I discuss the relationship between the
the existence of the external world is not questioned until the introduction 
of the Deceiver Hypothesis. First, most commentators hold that the pri­
mary aim of the dreaming passage is to raise the worry about whether we 
are awake. Cf., for example, E. M. Curley, Descartes Against the Skeptics (Cam­
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), chap. 3; Bernard Williams, Des­
cartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 
1978), 51-53; and Peter J. Markie, Descartes’s Gambit (Ithaca: Cornell Uni­
versity Press, 1986), 108-19. So understood, the Dreaming Argument is 
often thought to presuppose an external world in which to wake up. Sec­
ond, a popular reading of the passage introducing the Deceiver Hypothesis 
has it that the existence of the external, corporeal world is being called 
into question—for the first time—by this more radical doubt. Margaret 
Wilson, for example, in her Descartes (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1978), 16f., appeals to this reading for her view that it is merely the nature, 
but not the existence, of the external world that is in doubt as a result of 
the dreaming passage.
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Dream ing Argument, as typically understood, and the argument I 
propose in connection with unknown faculties.
1 . U nknow n Faculties and the A rgum ent fo r  the E xternal W orld
Descartes’s Sixth Meditation argument proceeds by process o f  elim ­
ination. The possible options fo r the cause o f  sensory ideas include
(a) something internal to the mind, or
(b ) something external to the mind, either
(i) corporeal substance,
(ii) some other created substance, or
(iii) God.
Baldly stated, all options except (b ) (i) are elim inated, thereby es­
tablishing the existence o f  the external, corporeal world.
Far from  being an artless clarification o f  the implications o f  hav­
ing established that God is no deceiver— as the standard interpre­
tation supposes— the argument provides a subtle example o f  Des­
cartes’s orderly procedure .3 Distinguish the follow ing two theses: 
first, that my sensory ideas o f  body are, at least in part, caused by 
something external to me, and second, that there exists an exter­
nal, corporeal world. I shall refer to these as the External Cause 
Thesis and the Corporeal Existence Thesis, respectively.4 Descar­
3In the Second Replies, Descartes describes the orderliness o f his pro­
cedure, noting that “ the items which are put forward first must be known 
entirely without the aid o f what comes later; and the remaining items must 
be arranged in such a way that their demonstration depends solely on what 
has gone before” (AT 7:155, CSM 2:110). Cf. also AT 7:9-10.
A T ’ refers to Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery 
(Paris: J. Vrin, 1964)); ‘CSM’ refers to The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 
ed. and trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984)); ‘CSMK’ refers to volume
3 o f CSM, for which Anthony Kenny is a contributing translator. References 
to both AT and CSM are to the volume and page.
^ h e  two theses are logically independent. Not only is the denial o f the 
External Cause Thesis consistent with the truth o f the Corporeal Existence 
Thesis, the truth o f the External Cause Thesis is consistent with the denial 
o f the Corporeal Existence Thesis, since my sensory ideas o f body may be 
transmitted to me directly from God (or some other noncorporeal sub­
stance).
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tes’s p roo f fo r the Corporeal Existence Thesis proceeds in three 
stages in which ordering is crucial. Before Descartes’s meditator 
can argue (in the third stage) that the external cause o f  his sensory 
ideas is corporeal substance, he must first rule out the possibility 
o f  a fully nativist explanation o f  these ideas, a possibility taken 
seriously in the early Meditations. And so, in the second stage o f 
the proof, the meditator argues fo r the External Cause Thesis by 
an appeal to introspection, an appeal which hinges on the trans­
parency o f  thought. But this step presupposes yet m ore work. Be­
fore the meditator can successfully appeal to a procedure o f  intro­
spection, he must first know that his whole essence is thought. And 
so, in the first stage o f  the proof, he argues fo r his own thinking 
nature and the real distinction between it and corporeal nature .5
Before reconstructing the Sixth Meditation argument, I want to 
trace the m editator’s earlier efforts to establish the Corporeal Ex­
istence Thesis. His initial e ffort is explained in the Th ird  Medita­
tion. Concerning his ideas o f  “ the earth, sky, stars, and everything 
else” that he “ apprehended with the senses,”  the meditator con­
cedes: “ I used to assert”  that “ there were things outside me which 
were the sources o f  my ideas” (A T  7:35, CSM 2:24-25). But since 
First Meditation doubt has left him unsure whether anything ex­
ternal exists, he reexamines the argument that originally led him 
to affirm  the Corporeal Existence Thesis, an argument that turns 
on the independence o f  his will from  his sensory ideas (i.e. those 
that seem to be adventitious):
I know by experience that these ideas do not depend on my will, and
hence that they do not depend simply on me. Frequently I notice
5Midway through the Fourth Meditation, the meditator is still in doubt 
whether his own thinking nature “ is distinct from this corporeal nature or 
identical with it” (AT 7:59, CSM 2:41). Though much o f the groundwork 
for establishing the real distinction is laid in the Second Meditation, it is 
not until the Sixth Meditation that Descartes thinks he has all the premises 
he needs (cf. AT 7:13, 7:129, 3:266, and 3:272). Even when finally in place, 
however, the conclusion that mind and body are distinct substances does 
not entail the Corporeal Existence Thesis, since Cartesian dualism con­
cerns the ontological independence o f mind and body but not their real 
existence. In the Principles 1.60, Descartes says that we know that “ two 
substances are really distinct simply from the fact that we can clearly and 
distinctly understand one apart from the other” ; and this we can know of 
mind and body “ even though we may not yet know for certain that any 
extended or corporeal substance exists in reality” (AT 8a:28, CSM 1:213).
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them even when I do not want to: now, for example, I feel the heat 
whether I want to or not, and this is why I think that this sensation or 
idea o f heat comes to me from something other than myself, namely 
the heat o f the fire by which I am sitting. (AT 7:38, CSM 2:26)6
In matters relating to the good, however, he often experiences 
inclinations that seem both to originate from  some internal faculty 
(within him ) and to oppose his will, a fact which underm ines the 
argument:
Then again, although these [seemingly adventitious] ideas do not de­
pend on my will, it does not follow that they must come from things 
located outside me. Just as the impulses which I was speaking o f a 
moment ago seem opposed to my will even though they are within 
me, so there may be some other faculty not yet fully known to me, which 
produces these ideas without any assistance from external things. (AT 7:39, 
CSM 2:27; italics mine)
The expressed worry is that his m ind may have the faculty o f  
producing his sensory ideas, even though introspection reveals no 
such potential.7 I shall hereafter refer to this as the Unknown Fac­
ulty Doubt (U FD ):
UFD: I have reason to worry that the sensory experiences that 
I take as normal and waking are produced by some un­
known, internal faculty (without any assistance from  ex­
ternal things).
Because o f  UFD, he opts to withhold judgm ent about the Corpo­
real Existence Thesis:
[I] t is not reliable judgement but merely some blind impulse that has 
made me believe up till now that there exist things distinct from myself 
which transmit to me ideas or images o f themselves through the sense 
organs or in some other way.
But it now occurs to me that there is another way o f investigating
6Cf. also the Sixth Meditation, AT 7:75.
7In his Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, Descartes explains that he is 
supposing that “ the term ‘faculty’ denotes nothing but a potentiality” (AT 
8b:361, CSM 1:305).
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whether some o f the things o f which I possess ideas exist outside me. 
(AT 7:39-40, CSM 2:27)
W hile this other way is taken as showing that God exists, it is un­
successful in establishing the Corporeal Existence Thesis ,8 and an­
other e ffort is not attempted until midway through the Sixth M ed­
itation .9
In his prelude to the Sixth Meditation proof, the meditator re­
iterates the role o f  UFD in underm ining his initial argument, while 
suggesting that his earlier doubts m ight now be unwarranted:
And despite the fact that the perceptions o f the senses were not de­
pendent on my will, I did not think that I should on that account infer 
that they proceeded from things distinct from myself, since I might 
perhaps have a faculty not yet known to me which produced them.
But now, when I am beginning to achieve a better knowledge of 
myself and the author o f my being, although I do not think I should 
heedlessly accept everything I seem to have acquired from the senses, 
neither do I think that everything should be called into doubt. (AT 7: 
77-78, CSM 2:53-54)
As we shall see, the reference, here, to an increased knowledge o f 
himself and o f  God forebodes the argument to come.
I turn now to the argument itself, and I summarize the first stage 
as follows.
8Prior to proving the existence o f God by means o f the famous causal 
principle— “ that there must be at least as much in the efficient and total 
cause as in the effect o f that cause” (AT 7:40, CSM 2:28)— the meditator 
attempts to prove the Corporeal Existence Thesis by the very same means. 
On the basis o f the principle, he notes: “ If the objective reality o f any o f 
my ideas turns out to be so great that I am sure the same reality does not 
reside in me, either formally or eminently, and hence that I myself cannot 
be its cause, it will necessarily follow that I am not alone in the world, but 
that some other thing which is the cause o f this idea also exists” (AT 7:42, 
CSM 2:29). As it turns out, however, neither his sensory ideas of corporeal 
substance (AT 7:43-44) nor his clear and distinct ideas o f corporeal sub­
stance (AT 7:44-45) are such that they could not have originated from 
some faculty o f his own mind. And so, this unsuccessful effort at establish­
ing the External Cause Thesis serves merely to reinforce UFD.
9There is an attempt at establishing the existence o f corporeal things 
that occurs early in the Sixth Meditation, an argument based on a consid­
eration o f the operations o f the imagination (AT 7:71-73). However, Des­
cartes thinks it supports only a “ probable conjecture,” and he dismisses 
the conclusion as “ only a probability” (AT 7:73, CSM 2:51).
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( 1 ) I am a substance whose whole essence is thought and am 
really distinct from  corporeal (extended) substance.
The secondary literature treating the details o f  Descartes’s argu­
ment fo r the real distinction o f  m ind and body is immense. Since 
my aim at present is to focus on that portion o f  Descartes’s argu­
ment that has been neglected in the literature— the role o f  un­
known faculties— I shall o ffer no defense o f  the first stage o f  Des­
cartes’s argument.
Establishing (1) serves as a partial refutation o f  UFD. UFD in­
vokes the follow ing possibilities concerning the relationship be­
tween the m editator’s own thought and the faculty causing his sen­
sory ideas o f  body :10 (a ) his thought and the faculty are both modes 
o f the same substance,11 (b ) his thought is a m ode o f  the faculty,
(c ) the faculty is a m ode o f  his thought, or (d ) the faculty just is 
his thought. But (1) eliminates (a) and (b ), since the meditator 
now knows he (qua thinking thing) is not a m ode o f  any substance. 
It is in the second stage o f  the argument that options (c ) and (d ) 
are addressed.
A t first glance, the argument o f  the second stage appears to be 
a rehash o f  the meditator’s former, naive effort at establishing the 
existence o f  external things. In that effort, the fact that his seem­
ingly adventitious sensory ideas came to him independently o f  his 
will— as established by introspection— was taken as inadequate 
grounds fo r in ferring an external cause o f  such ideas, precisely 
because o f  UFD. And yet, here in the Sixth Meditation argument, 
the meditator infers that the faculty causing his sensory ideas is 
external to him, since, as he says, “ the ideas in question are pro­
10Our sensory ideas (qua their objective reality) o f body are not ideas o f 
the essence o f body, as the earlier wax passage is supposed to show; nor 
are they ideas o f the essence o f mind. At best, then, they are ideas o f 
modes, though it is not until later in the Sixth Meditation that the medi­
tator discovers what these modes are referred to (AT 7:82-83; c f Principles 
1.48). As such, it is consistent with Descartes’s causal principle (namely, 
that there be as much formal reality in the cause o f an idea as there is 
objective reality in the idea itself) that the causes o f our sensory ideas are 
themselves modes.
n By this point in the Meditations, the conception o f (created) substance 
as “ a thing capable o f existing independently” (o f any other creature) has 
been articulated (AT 7:44, CSM 2:30), as has the relationship o f substance 
to mode (cf. AT 7:44-45).
L E X  N E W M A N
duced without my cooperation and often even against my w ill”  (A T  
7:79, CSM 2:55). Our problem, then, is to understand why Des­
cartes thinks this independence o f  such ideas from  on e ’s will— as 
established by introspection— succeeds in the Sixth Meditation 
where it failed in the Third.
Though the text o f  the Sixth Meditation is somewhat unclear, 
Descartes elsewhere refers to the transparency doctrine o f  mind, 
according to which there is nothing in the mind of which we are not 
aware, and says that he intended it to be a consequence o f  the 
claim in (1 ): “ What I say later, ‘nothing can be in me, that is to 
say, in my mind, o f  which I am not aware’ , is something which I 
proved in my Meditations, and it follows from  the fact that the soul 
is distinct from  the body and that its essence is to think”  (A T  3: 
273; CSMK, 165-66).12 The payoff, according to Descartes, is that 
transparency o f  thought guarantees that introspection will reveal 
the operations o f  all mental faculties (known or unknown); that is,
(2 ) For any faculty (known or unknown) in me, I am aware o f 
it when its operations occur.
In the Th ird  Meditation, the meditator had not yet established that 
his entire essence was thought, a fact that renders introspection 
inconclusive;13 in the Sixth Meditation, (1 ) having been estab­
lished, introspection m ight succeed.
12This comes from a letter to Mersenne (31 December 1640) in which, 
among other things, he and Mersenne are discussing amendments to the 
text o f the First Replies. Among the First Replies items they discuss is a 
reference, by Descartes, to the transparency doctrine (AT 7:107). Though 
I have been unable to locate this letter from Mersenne as extant, it appears 
that Mersenne had inquired as to where, in the Meditations, Descartes 
proves the doctrine.
13In the Third Meditation, Descartes does invoke the transparency doc­
trine, but he is careful to add a qualification: “ For since I am nothing but 
a thinking thing— or at least since I  am now concerned only and precisely with 
that part of me which is a thinking thing—if there were such a power in me, 
I should undoubtedly be aware o f it” (AT 7:49, CSM 2:33-34; italics mine). 
Though, as the Second Meditation is supposed to show, “we do not rec­
ognize anything corporeal” in the soul, Descartes does not yet think he 
has established “ that there is nothing corporeal in the soul” (AT 9a:215, 
CSM 2:276; cf. note 5 above). Descartes thinks this Third Meditation appeal 
to transparency is legitimate precisely because it occurs in a context where 
the possibility o f unknown corporeal faculties has been bracketed (AT 7: 
107).
In his “ Descartes on Unknown Faculties: An Essential Inconsistency,”
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Descartes has in m ind two (partial) definitions, those o f  thinking 
thing and thought, which serve as interm ediate premises in the 
in ference from  ( 1 ) to ( 2 ): ( i )  any operation (including those o f  
unknown faculties) attributed to a thinking thing is itself a thought; 
(ii) there is no thought “ o f  which we are not aware at the very 
m om ent when it is in us”  (A T  7:246, CSM 2:171). Concern ing
(i ) ,  the m editator remarks (im m ediately fo llow ing the p roo f fo r 
(1)):
Besides this, I find in myself faculties for certain special modes o f 
thinking, namely imagination and sensory perception. Now I can 
clearly and distinctly understand myself as a whole without these fac­
ulties; but I cannot, conversely, understand these faculties without 
me, that is, without an intellectual substance to inhere in. This is 
because there is an intellectual act14 included in their essential def­
inition; and hence I perceive that the distinction between them and 
myself corresponds to the distinction between the modes o f a thing 
and the thing itself. (AT 7:78, CSM 2:54)
An  understanding o f  a m ode always presupposes an understand­
ing o f  the principal attribute (the essence) o f  the substance in 
which it inheres ,15 and the m editator now knows h im self to be an 
essentially thinking thing. H e acknowledges that
Journal of the History of Philosophy 6 (1968): 245-56, David Fate Norton ar­
gues, o f this same Third Meditation passage, that it is inconsistent with the 
Third Meditation worry about unknown mental faculties (that is, UFD). 
The charge o f inconsistency rests on the mistaken supposition that Des­
cartes thinks transparency extends to the meditator’s whole essence at this 
stage in the Meditations. It is not until (1) is established, in the Sixth Med­
itation, that the meditator knows in what his whole essence consists.
14In referring to an intellectual act (intellectionem), Descartes is not re­
ferring to action as opposed to passion, but to an actuality as opposed to 
a mere potentiality or faculty. As such, he uses ‘act’ , in this context, to refer 
to a thing’s operations or modes or ways o f being.
15In the Principles 1.53, Descartes writes that “ each substance has one 
principal property which constitutes its nature and essence, and to which 
all its other properties are referred. Thus extension in length, breadth and 
depth constitutes the nature o f corporeal substance; and thought consti­
tutes the nature o f thinking substance. Everything else which can be at­
tributed to body presupposes extension, and is merely a mode o f an ex­
tended thing; and similarly, whatever we find in the mind is simply one o f 
the various modes o f thinking” (AT 8a:25, CSM 1:210).
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there are other faculties (like those o f changing position, o f taking 
on various shapes, and so on) which, like sensory perception and 
imagination, cannot be understood apart from some substance for 
them to inhere in, and hence cannot exist without it. But it is clear 
that these other faculties, if they exist, must be in a corporeal or 
extended substance and not an intellectual one; for the clear and 
distinct conception o f them includes extension, but does not include 
any intellectual act whatsoever. (AT 7:78-79, CSM 2:54-55).
Thus, all faculties (potentialities) o f  m ind are actualized as 
thoughts (o f  some m ode or o ther). As fo r  (ii ) ,  Descartes says, o f  
the term ‘ thought’ :
I use this term to include everything that is within us in such a way 
that we are immediately aware o f it. Thus all the operations o f the 
will, the intellect, the imagination and the senses are thoughts. (AT 
7:160, CSM 2:113)
As form ulated, however, (2 ) does not look  to be enough to 
guarantee that introspection will rule out UFD. In order to be 
sure that the cause o f  my sensory ideas is not some unknown 
faculty in me, I would need not merely an awareness o f my fac­
ulties whose operations are occurring, but an awareness o f  them 
as causes; but (2 ) guarantees only the form er, not the latter. Let 
me introduce Descartes’s term inology and then restate the objec­
tion in his terms. Every faculty o f  the m ind can be regarded as 
either active or passive; the m ind ’s active faculties are those whose 
operations bring about the operation o f  some other faculty (be it 
mental or corporeal), and the m ind ’s passive faculties are those 
whose operations are brought about by some other faculty (be it 
mental or corporeal) . 16 The objection, then, is this: I can be sure
16In a letter to Regius, Descartes explains this action-passion distinction 
by analogy to body: “ [W ]e call it an ‘action’ when the motion is considered 
in the body that imparts the motion, and a ‘passion’ when it is considered 
in the body that is moved. It follows from this that when the terms are 
extended to immaterial things, there is something in such things which 
has to be considered as analogous to motion. So we should use the term 
‘action’ for what plays the role o f a moving force, like volition in the mind, 
while we apply the term ‘passion’ to what plays the role o f something 
moved, like intellection and vision in the same mind” (AT 3:454-55; 
CSMK, 199).
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that my sensory ideas have not been caused by some unknown 
active faculty in me only i f  the transparency doctrine allows an 
awareness o f  my active faculties as active on the occasion o f  their 
operations. Transparency must allow that, by introspection, I can 
detect the manner in which my ideas com e to m e— actively or 
passively.
From a letter to Hyperaspistes, it appears that Descartes rec­
ognizes this need, and that he is supposing that introspection 
does in fact reveal this: “ I proved the existence o f  material things 
not from  the fact that we have ideas o f  them but from  the fact 
that these ideas come to us in such a way as to make us aware that 
they are not produced by ourselves”  (A T  3:428-29, CSM K 193; italics 
m ine). Since having an awareness o f  whether an operation o f  my 
m ind has been produced by me (qua thinking thing) just is the 
having o f  an awareness o f  whether it is an activity o f  my mind, I 
want to reconstruct the second stage o f  Descartes’s Sixth M ed i­
tation argum ent around a version o f  the transparency doctrine 
that allows fo r this. I form ulate the second stage as follows:
(2 ) ' For any active faculty (known or unknown) in me, I am 
aware o f  it (as active) when its operations occur. [ ( 1 ) ]
(3 ) Since my faculty o f  sensing is passive, I can experience 
sensory ideas only when some active faculty cooperates 
with it in causing the ideas.
(4 ) I f  the active faculty causing my sensory ideas o f  corpo­
real substance were in me, I would be aware o f  it (as 
active) when experiencing sensory ideas o f  corporeal 
substance. [ (2 ) ', (3 ) ]
(5 ) W hen experiencing involuntary sensory ideas o f  cor­
poreal substance, I am not aware o f  their active cause.
( 6 ) The active faculty causing my involuntary sensory ideas 
o f  corporeal substance is not in me. [ (4 ) , (5 ) ]
The version o f  transparency in (2 ) ' does not require an aware­
ness o f  causal relations between mental operations, but merely an 
awareness o f  individual mental operations as causes (o r  as 
caused). Descartes thinks such an awareness follows from  (i) and 
(ii ) ,  since activities o f  the m ind are themselves mental operations:
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since they are mental operations, they are thoughts; since they 
are thoughts, we have awareness o f  them. For (2 ) ' to be false, 
there would have to be some leftover doing, in virtue o f  which the 
operation in question is an activity o f  the mind, but concern ing 
which transparency does not provide the requisite awareness. But 
fo r this to be the case, this leftover doing is itself either an oper­
ation o f  which I am unaware, or else an operation o f  which I am 
aware but which I misidentify. The form er is ru led out by (i) and
(ii). A nd  Descartes thinks the latter is ruled out by the incorri­
gibility o f  the mental, as the m editator explains:
Now as far as ideas are concerned, provided they are considered 
solely in themselves and I do not refer them to anything else, they 
cannot strictly speaking be false; for whether it is a goat or a chimera 
that I am imagining, it is just as true that I imagine the former as 
the latter. As for the will and the emotions, here too one need not 
worry about falsity; for even if the things which I may desire are 
wicked or even non-existent, that does not make it any less true that 
I desire them. (AT 7:37, CSM 2:26)
For Descartes, ‘w illing ’ is the name we use to describe the m ind ’s 
activities or doings (cf. A T  3:372), and “ we experience them as 
proceeding directly from  our soul and as seem ing to depend on 
it a lone”  (A T  11:342, CSM 1:335). The only way I can fail to be 
aware o f  the doing that is causing my sensory ideas is i f  it is not 
itself an operation o f  my mind. There is som ething le ft over, ac­
cording to Descartes, i f  the fact that my arm goes up, and my 
awareness o f  its do ing so, are subtracted from  the fact that I raise 
my arm, and that something is an activity o f  the m ind o f  which I 
have an awareness— an awareness as a doing.11
Consider (3 ). As the m editator observes:
Now there is in me a passive faculty o f sensory perception, that is, a 
faculty for receiving and recognizing the ideas o f sensible objects; 
but I could not make use o f it unless there was also an active faculty,
17Since the nature o f thought and thinking substance remains the same 
whether one is awake or asleep, the implications o f and (2) and (2)' extend 
not only to waking experiences but to dream experiences as well (c f Prin­
ciples 1.9).
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either in me or in something else, which produced or brought about 
these ideas. (AT 7:79, CSM 2:54-55)
That the faculty o f  sensing is passive would not have been chal­
lenged by Descartes’s contem poraries, as the tradition o f  hold ing 
that the senses require stimulation in order to produce sense per­
ception dates back to the ancients. Quite aside from  the tradition, 
introspection reveals, o f  the seemingly adventitious ideas that the 
meditator calls ‘ sensory’ , that they are not activities o f  his mind.
The claim in (4 ) is a consequence o f  (2 ) ' and (3 ) . 18 Given that 
my awareness o f  intellectual operations extends to whether they 
are active, I would be aware o f  bringing about my sensory ideas, 
were they being actively caused by some faculty o f  me (qua think­
ing th ing).
The justification o f  (5 ) comes by means o f  introspection. On 
the occasion o f  involuntary sensory ideas, I take a phenom eno­
logical inventory o f  my mind, and find that the active cause o f  
the ideas is not there .19 Indeed, to say that a sensory experience 
is involuntary is just to say that I am aware o f  no activity o f  m ine 
that is bringing it about— Descartes holds, o f  the mind, that “ only 
its volitions are activities”  (A T  4:113-14, CSM K 232).
( 6 ) follows from  (4 ) and (5 ). Since I am not aware o f  any doings 
whose contents specify the bringing about o f  the sensory ideas in 
question, no such activity is in m e .20 And this establishes the Ex­
ternal Cause Thesis.
18There is, o f course, an additional assumption involved in the infer­
ence, namely, that the operations o f the active faculty in question are si­
multaneous with the sensory ideas in relation to which they are active. 
Since Descartes rejects the possibility o f action at a (temporal) distance, 
he supposes “ it is contradictory that there should be a passivity without an 
activity for even a single moment” (AT 3:428, CSMK 193).
19In the case o f voluntary sensory ideas (voluntary imaginings), I am 
aware o f an active cause. Descartes holds that brain events are also active 
with respect to these ideas, since the needed memory is located in the 
brain (cf. Passions 1.1 on the relational aspect o f the action-passion distinc­
tion). But in such cases, my volitional activity provides what is, in effect, 
the triggering active cause.
20N o w  one might worry that this interference does not go through, 
since it may be possible that acts o f willing are sometimes unsuccessful, as 
in the following scenario: Suppose I am aware o f the doing that aims at 
bringing about the idea o f a triangle, and yet, unknown to me, this same 
activity turns out to be the active cause o f the sensory ideas that I take as 
“ involuntary.” If  this is possible, then one might have volitional awareness
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But this faculty cannot be in me, since clearly it presupposes no in­
tellectual act on my part, and the ideas in question are produced 
without my cooperation and often even against my will. So the only 
alternative is that it is in another substance distinct from me— a sub­
stance which contains either formally or eminently all the reality 
which exists objectively in the ideas produced by this faculty (as I 
have just noted).21 (AT 7:79, CSM 2:54—55)
By introspection, then, the m editator is able to deal with the two 
rem aining options invoked by UFD concern ing the relationship 
between his own thought and the faculty causing his involuntary 
sensory ideas o f  body :22 both (c ) and (d ) can now be ruled out 
with respect to the active faculty causing these sensory ideas. Hav­
ing established that his whole essence is thought, the argum ent by 
introspection now succeeds where the Th ird  M editation e ffort 
failed.
Before m oving on to the third stage o f  the argument, I want to 
point out that there is noth ing said, in the second stage, that is 
incom patible with the theory o f  innate ideas, even though Des­
o f the sort specified in (2 )' without thereby being aware o f which passivities 
the volition was in fact bringing about. One obvious solution would be to 
further strengthen the transparency doctrine so as to allow for an aware­
ness o f mental-to-mental causal relations. I suspect that Descartes holds 
some such account, but since the texts are inconclusive I have relied on 
the weaker statement o f the doctrine in (2)'.
21In the Principles II. 1 version o f the argument for the Corporeal Exis­
tence Thesis, Descartes appears to arrive hastily at the External Cause The­
sis— in a manner quite insufficient to rule out UFD— and then focus pri­
marily on what is, in the Sixth Meditation account, the third stage. But in 
fact the Principles account is not so reckless as this: the counterpart to the 
first stage (o f the Meditations account) is established in Principles 1.8, and 
the transparency o f mind is elucidated in 1.9. These establish the central 
claims that would be needed to rule out UFD.
Bear in mind, as well, that the two works are written in very different 
styles— the Meditations is written much more according to the method o f 
analysis than is the Principles. The Sixth Meditation account occurs in the 
context o f a highly systematic treatment o f radical doubt, which is given 
only perfunctory treatment in the Principles. Whereas proving the incor­
poreality o f the mind and its real distinction from the body are important 
metaphysical tasks in the Meditations, Descartes treats them in summary 
form in the Principles. This is consistent with his characterization o f the 
latter (that is, that portion in which such matters are treated) as an 
abridged version o f the material in the Meditations (AT 5:291).
22Namely, (c) the faculty is a mode o f his thought, and (d) the faculty 
just is his thought.
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cartes characterizes innate ideas not only as potentialities or fac­
ulties (A T  8b:361), but as faculties which simple introspection 
may not reveal. In his reply to Hobbes, Descartes clarifies that 
“ when we say that an idea is innate in us, we do not mean that 
it is always there before us. This would mean that no idea was 
innate. We simply mean that we have within ourselves the faculty 
o f  summoning up the idea”  (A T  7:189, CSM 2:132). Yet, accord­
ing to Descartes, though we are potentially aware o f  the eternal 
truths with which God has stocked our minds, in many cases we 
remain unaware o f  them ( Principles 1.49-50). As he writes to Hy- 
peraspistes (August 1641), “ I do not doubt that everyone has 
within h im self an im plicit idea o f  God, that is to say, an aptitude 
to perceive it explicitly; but I am not surprised that not everyone 
is aware that he has it or notices that he has it. Some peop le will 
perhaps not notice it even after reading my Meditations a thousand 
times”  (A T  3:430, CSM K 194). As we have seen, the transparency 
doctrine is incom patible with unknown operations, but it does 
not rule out the possibility o f  unknown faculties that remain 
merely potential (cf. A T  7:246-47). Th e argum ent o f  the second 
stage, then, is not in tended to rule out all unknown faculties, but 
only the possibility that an unknown faculty is an actor in the 
production o f  our involuntary sensory ideas. A nd  this is enough 
to refute UFD, at least insofar as UFD induces a fully  nativist ex­
planation o f  these sensory ideas: whether we are awake or asleep, 
the active cause o f  our involuntary sensory ideas must com e from  
something external, though an otherwise nativist account remains 
a possibility.
We now have two o f  the three stages o f  Descartes’s argum ent 
fo r the Corporeal Existence Thesis. Granting that he has shown 
the externality o f  the cause o f  involuntary sensory ideas, Descartes 
needs only to establish its corporeality, his argum ent fo r  this occurs 
in the third stage. Since it is the second stage that is o f  interest 
to the thesis that I am pursuing in this paper, my treatment o f  
the third stage will be cursory.23
(7 ) Th e active faculty causing my involuntary sensory ideas 
o f  corporeal substance is one o f  the fo llow ing:
23For a more elaborate treatment see Daniel Garber’s Descartes’ Meta­
physical Physics (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1992), 7Iff.
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( i) corporeal substance,
(ii) some other created substance (external to m e ), or
(iii) God. [ ( 1 ) , ( 6 ) ]
(8 ) Since God is no deceiver, (ii )  and (iii) are ruled out.
(9 ) The active faculty causing my involuntary sensory ideas 
o f  corporeal substance is corporeal substance. [ ( 7 ) , ( 8 ) ]
The options in (7 ) are intended to be exhaustive. That they 
are follows in part from  ( 6 ) — having ruled out the possibility o f  
an active cause internal to the meditator; in part from  ( 1 ) — cor­
poreal substance turns out to be external to the meditator; and 
in part from  having proven, in the Th ird  M editation, that he (the 
m editator) is not God.
The key to this stage o f  the argum ent is the appeal to divine 
benevolence in ( 8 ), an appeal that presupposes elements o f  the 
theodicy earlier worked out in the Fourth M ed itation .24 Granting
( 8 ), (9 ) follows, and with it the truth o f  the Corporeal Existence 
Thesis.
But since God is not a deceiver, it is quite clear that he does not 
transmit the ideas to me either directly from himself, or indirectly, 
via some creature which contains the objective reality o f the ideas 
not formally but only eminently. For God has given me no faculty at 
all for recognizing any such source for these ideas; on the contrary,
24In my “ Cartesian Theodicy and the Criterion o f Truth” (unpubli­
shed) , I offer an analysis o f the Fourth Meditation theodicy Descartes relies 
on here. One consequence o f the theodicy is that God (as an essentially 
omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being) is compatible only with 
those judgment errors that we have the capacity to correct. Since, then, 
we are inclined to think (concerning the options in (7 )) that (i) is the 
case rather than (ii) or (iii), and we are incapable o f correcting our error 
(on the assumption that we are in error), it follows that we are not in 
error— since “ God is not a deceiver,” there is a “ consequent impossibility 
o f there being any falsity in [our] opinions which cannot be corrected by 
some other faculty supplied by God” (AT 7:80, CSM 2:55-56). This ex­
plains, in part, why UFD is not included as a fourth option in (7) and 
eliminated along with (ii) and (iii) by the appeal to benevolence in (8): 
on the assumption that an unknown mental faculty is the active cause of 
our involuntary sensory ideas, and thus that (i) is false, we do have the 
capacity, thinks Descartes, for correcting the resulting error— namely, by 
means o f introspection, as occurred in the second stage of the argument.
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he has given me a great propensity to believe that they are produced 
by corporeal things. So I do not see how God could be understood 
to be anything but a deceiver if the ideas were transmitted from a 
source other than corporeal things. It follows that corporeal things 
exist. (AT 7:79-80, CSM 2:55)
The argum ent establishes that the active cause o f  all involun­
tary sensory ideas is corporeal substance, and it does so even 
though the m editator is not yet sure what his own body is like 
(assuming he has on e ). Descartes holds that even nonveridical, 
involuntary sensory ideas are actively caused by corporeal sub­
stance, as he explains in the Passions:
Among the perceptions caused by the [human] body, most o f them 
depend on the nerves. But there are some which do not and which, 
like those I have just described [voluntary imaginings], are called 
‘imaginings’ . These differ from the others, however, in that our will 
is not used in forming them. Accordingly they cannot be numbered 
among the actions o f the soul, for they arise simply from the fact 
that the spirits, being agitated in various different ways and coming 
upon the traces o f various impressions which have preceded them in 
the brain, make their way by chance through certain pores rather 
than others. Such are the illusions o f our dreams and also the day­
dreams we often have when we are awake and our mind wanders idly 
without applying itself to anything o f its own accord.25 (AT 11:344­
45, CSM 1:336)
Indeed, it is critical that the argum ent apply to the case o f  dreams, 
since at this stage o f  the Sixth M editation the m editator has not 
yet ruled out the possibility that he is at present asleep .26
2 . T h e  Standard In terpretation  R evisited
Recall that according to the standard interpretation,
(A ) skeptical doubts about the Corporeal Existence Thesis
25Cf. also AT 6:141 and 3:424-25. To the extent that dreams are thought 
to be actively caused by the motion o f various spirits, humors, and vapors 
in the body, Descartes is in agreement with the Aristotelian view (cf. Summa 
Theologica la.111.3, la.84.8, and De Somniss II 461a).
26The supposition that he might be asleep begins in the First Meditation 
(cf. AT 7:19 and 7:23) and remains in place until the very end o f the Sixth 
Meditation where it is then challenged (AT 7:89f.).
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are generated only by means o f  the D eceiver Hypothesis, 
and
(B ) these same doubts are dismissed (in  the Sixth M edita­
tion ) by means o f  a straightforward undoing o f  the First 
M editation skeptical prob lem — corporeal substance must 
be the cause o f  our sensory ideas, since God has been 
shown to be no deceiver.
The fo rego in g  analysis o f  the Sixth M editation argum ent shows 
that (B ) is in fact false. Rather than straightforwardly undoing 
the external world doubts (which by hypothesis have been ) en­
gendered by the D eceiver Hypothesis, the argum ent proceeds in 
an exceedingly circuitous manner— one which leaves room  fo r 
the possibility o f  a m itigated version o f  nativism. In fact, I want 
to argue, (B ) must be false on pain o f  underm ining Descartes’s 
theory o f  innate ideas.
Distinguish the fo llow ing two causal claims:
(10) Th e active cause o f  my sensory ideas lies with external, 
corporeal substance.
(11) The ultimate source o f  the images in my sensory ideas 
lies with external, corporeal substance.
The skeptical device that questions the Corporeal Existence Th e­
sis must call (11) into doubt— not m erely (1 0 )— since that any 
external, corporeal matter is involved at any stage in the produc­
tion o f  my sensory ideas entails the truth o f  the thesis, and since 
many o f  Descartes’s readers hold  that there is noth ing in the in­
tellect which was not previously in the senses.27 Granting (A ) , then 
i f  (B ) were true— that is, i f  the Sixth M editation p roo f were a 
straightforward undoing o f  the First M editation worry— the con­
clusion o f  the Sixth M editation argum ent would entail that (11) 
is true— at least, to the extent that one initially held to some ver­
sion o f  ( l l ) ;28 moreover, its truth could be established directly,
27Indeed, Descartes intends the meditator to be, in part, a spokesperson 
for the Aristotelian: “ I had nothing at all in the intellect which I had not 
previously had in sensation” (AT 7:75, CSM 2:52). See note 55 below.
28It would, since if X provides my only grounds for doubting Y or Z, then 
subsequent to establishing that not-X, I no longer have grounds for doubt­
ing Y or Z.
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rather than by means o f  the oblique strategy actually em ployed—  
one which focuses on the active cause o f  our sensory ideas. But 
as we have seen, not only is Descartes’s argum ent not direct, its 
conclusion only establishes ( 1 0 ). ( 1 1 ) never is reinstated in the 
Meditations, and there is good  reason fo r this: (11) is incom patible 
with the theory o f  innate ideas. Descartes holds not only that the 
quantitative ideas o f  geom etry are innate, but that “ the ideas o f  
pain, colours, sounds and the like must be all the m ore innate if, 
on the occasion o f  certain corporeal motions, our m ind is to be 
capable o f  representing them to itself, fo r there is no similarity 
between these ideas and the corporeal m otions”  (A T  8b:359, CSM 
1:304).29
This very same defect that encumbers (B ) also forestalls any 
e ffort to salvage the standard interpretation even as far as (A ). 
W hether or not the m editator bothers to take explicit notice, the 
truth o f  ( 1 1 ) remains a consequence o f  divine benevolence so 
long as the Deceiver Hypothesis (as the standard interpreter 
holds) offers the only grounds fo r questioning ( 1 1 ).
This tension with the theory o f  innateness could be resolved, 
i f  the m editator had grounds, independent o f  the D eceiver Hy­
pothesis, fo r  doubting (10) and (11). In  that case, so long as only 
a b e lie f o f  ( 1 0 ) were specifically restored, there would be room  
fo r Cartesian nativism. It is not m ere happenstance that in his 
Sixth M editation argument, Descartes leaves UFD intact to an ex­
tent that allows fo r a m itigated version o f  nativism. N o r is it co­
incidence that UFD is a sufficiently potent skeptical device to un­
derm ine the Corporeal Existence Thesis: by questioning the 
External Cause Thesis, UFD thereby casts doubt on the Corporeal 
Existence Thesis, since the very motivation fo r the b e lie f in an 
external, corporeal world stems from  the b e lie f that we have sen­
sory interaction with such a w orld .30 In section 4, I argue that 
UFD is in fact Descartes’s trump card in generating the problem  
o f  the external, corporeal world, and I defend the fo llow ing in­
terpretive hypothesis in opposition to (A ):
(C ) Skeptical doubts about the Corporeal Existence Thesis 
are initially raised (in  the First M ed itation ) in the mad­
29Cf. also Optics, AT 6:130-31, and Principles IV. 198.
30This holds all the more for Descartes’s Aristotelian audience.
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ness and dream ing passage, in connection with a w orry 
about unknown faculties.
In the two clearest texts dealing with UFD, the w orry about an 
unknown faculty is explicitly re ferred  to dreams: “ There may be 
some other faculty not yet fully known to me, which produces 
these [sensory] ideas without any assistance from  external things; 
this is, after all, just how I have always thought ideas are produced 
in me when I am dream ing”  (A T  7:39, CSM 2:27). In the Second 
M editation, skeptical doubts about the Corporeal Existence T h e­
sis are also re ferred  to dreams: “ N ow  I know fo r certain both that 
I exist and at the same time that all such images [o f  corporeal 
things] and, in general, everyth ing relating to the nature o f  body, 
could be m ere dreams” (A T  7:28, CSM 2:19).
Up to now, I have argued that (B ) is false and that its com ple­
ment (A ) has less explanatory value than (C ) vis-a-vis the theory 
o f  innate ideas. In section 4, I shall argue that (C ) has m ore ex­
planatory value than (A ) vis-a-vis the relevant First Meditation (and 
other Cartesian) texts. But first I want to establish that there is 
important historical precedent associating UFD with madness and 
dreaming, an association I later exploit in my defense o f  (C ).
3 . M adness and Dream ing: T h e  Skeptical Tradition
The Academ y opposed the Stoic doctrine according to which there 
is a class o f  privileged perceptions immune to error— the so-called 
cognitive or kataleptic impressions.31 As an essential part o f  the 
Stoic doctrine, nonveridical presentations could never be confused 
with cognitive impressions, a view that was systematically attacked 
by the Academics (led  by Arcesilas and later by Carneades). C icero 
reports that those in the Academ y would
first attempt to show the possibility that many things may appear to 
exist that are absolutely non-existent, since the mind is deceptively
31For a careful treatment o f this debate, see Michael Frede, “ Stoics and 
Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions,” in Essays in Ancient Philosophy 
(Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1987). It is worth noting that 
the Stoic cognitive impressions are a precursor to Descartes’s own clear 
and distinct perception.
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affected by non-existent objects in the same manner as it is affected 
by real ones. (Academica II 47)32
This strategy was thought to underm ine the Stoic doctrine o f  the 
inerrancy o f  cognitive impressions:
Some presentations are true, others false;33 and what is false cannot 
be perceived. But a true presentation is invariably o f such a sort that 
a false presentation also could be o f exacdy the same sort; and among 
presentations o f such a sort that there is no difference between them, 
it cannot occur that some are capable o f being perceived and others 
are not. Therefore there is no presentation that is capable o f being 
perceived. {Acad. II 40-41)
The claim here brings to m ind a version o f  Leibn iz ’s principle 
o f  substitutivity applied to perceptual indistinguishables: i f  there 
are instances from  two different classes o f  sensory perceptions 
which are qualitatively indistinguishable, we are justified in infer­
ring exactly the same things from  the one class as from  the other.34 
I shall call this the Academ ic Skeptical Thesis (A ST ):
AST: I f  some sensory experiences o f  kind X  are qualitatively 
indistinguishable from  those o f  kind Y, and I have reason 
to suppose that those o f  kind X  are produced in an un­
trustworthy manner, then I have reason to worry that 
those o f  kind Y  may be produced in an equally untrust­
worthy manner.35
32From the H. Rackham translation (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1933).
33While we take true and false to be properties o f propositions, the an­
cients took them to be properties o f perceptions as well (cf. our use of 
‘veridical’ and ‘nonveridical’ ).
34Cf. also Acad. II 56-58 and 49-50.
35If, for any X-type experience, it were wholly indistinguishable from any 
F-type experience, the supposition that these really are distinct kinds would 
be problematic. (Cf., e.g., J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1962), chap. 5.) But the Academics did not deny that 
there are sufficient grounds for us to make discriminations between the 
two kinds o f experiences in order to classify them as distinct; consider, for 
instance, that we discriminate between those experiences we call dreams 
and those we call waking, in part, on the basis o f waking-up experiences 
(cf. Acad. II 51-52).
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According to AST, we would be unjustified in in ferring that exter­
nal objects cause the sensory experiences we take as normal, wak­
ing ones, i f  there were a second class o f  experiences, qualitatively 
indistinguishable from  the first, fo r which we were unwilling to 
make such an in ference— “ the man who has a presentation o f  the 
true and the false that is com m on to both cannot have any crite­
rion or any mark o f  truth at a ll”  (Acad. II 33) .36
Since there are such classes o f  nonveridical perceptions (quali­
tatively indistinguishable from  those we take as normal and wak­
ing), the veracity o f  normal perception was called into doubt in 
accordance with AST. The classes o f  perceptions that the Academ ­
ics cited were those experienced in madness and dreams:37
36In this respect, the strategy o f the Academics differs from a standard 
Pyrrhonian tactic with respect to the reality o f sensible objects. While the 
skeptical attitude o f the Academics towards cognitive impression is based 
on similarity, the Pyrrhonian attitude in such contexts is typically based on 
difference. The Pyrrhonian suspends judgment towards both x and y, since 
they differ and there is no criterion for preferring the one over the other— 
as with the tower in the distance that appears round from one perspective 
while square from another. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I 
87-89, 100-17, II 53-54, and 58-60.
37Note also that Thomas cites Augustine as appealing to the following 
argument, one that undermines the veracity o f the senses by appeal to 
madness and dreams:
[Everything that we sense by means of the body we also receive in images, 
even when the things are not present to the senses (as for instance in sleep 
or in a rage). Yet we cannot distinguish by means of the senses whether we 
are perceiving the sensible things themselves or false images, and nothing 
can be perceived which is indistinguishable from what is false. (Summa 
la.84 .6 , trans. Paul T. Durbin (Blackfriars edition, 1964, vol. 12))
And Henry o f Ghent appealed to the following version o f AST:
No-one possesses certain and infallible knowledge of the truth unless he can 
distinguish the truth from what has only the appearance of truth, for if he is 
unable to tell the true from the false or from what appears to be true, he can 
still be in doubt whether he is being deceived or not. (Scotus, Philosophical 
Writings, trans. Allan Wolter (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 
101.)
Henry was later challenged on this by John Duns Scotus; at issue between 
them were the perceptions o f madness and dreaming (cf. ibid., 118f.). (For 
an informative study o f Henry’s familiarity with Cicero’s Academica, see 
Charles B. Schmitt’s Cicero Scepticus: A Study of the Influence of ^ Academ ica 
in the Renaissance (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), 39-41.)
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Then, since the mind is capable o f entirely self-originated motion, as 
is manifest by our faculty o f mental imagination and by the visions 
that sometimes appear to men either when asleep or mad, it is prob­
able that the mind may also be set in motion in such a manner that 
not only it cannot distinguish whether the presentations in question 
[the Stoic cognitive impressions] are true or false but that there really 
is no difference at all between them: just as if people were to shiver 
and turn pale either o f themselves as a result o f some mental emotion 
or in consequence o f encountering some terrifying external object, 
with nothing to distinguish between the two kinds o f shivering and 
pallor, and without any difference between the internal state o f feeling 
and the one that came from without. (Acad. II 48)
The claim, here, is that some faculty or potentiality o f  the m ind 
m ight be responsible fo r cognitive impressions, just as some such 
faculty was thought responsible fo r the presentations experienced 
by madmen and dreamers. The entirely self-originated motion remark 
suggests a total lack o f  assistance from  external objects, the (fu ll) 
causal story being referred to some internal capacity. We have here 
an occurrence o f  UFD being generated from  AST in conjunction 
with an appeal to madness and dream ing .38
According to C icero ’s account, the Stoics, recognizing what was 
at stake, responded to the skeptical arguments o f  the Academy by 
obstinately rejecting the claim o f  indistinguishability:
Consequently there is only one way o f routing the difficulty about
38In the later Montaigne, who was influenced by both the Pyrrhonian 
and the Academic traditions, we find an appeal to dreaming which (like 
that in the Academics) invokes the skeptical worry that the very same kind 
of mental capacities or faculties that account for sleeping experiences may 
also account for waking ones:
Those who have compared our life to a dream were perhaps more right than 
they thought. When we dream, our soul lives, acts, exercises all her faculties, 
neither more nor less than when she is awake . . . Since our reason and our 
soul accept the fancies and opinions which arise in it while sleeping, and au­
thorize the actions of our dreams with the same approbation as they do those 
of the day, why do we not consider the possibility that our thinking, our acting, 
may be another sort of dreaming, and our waking another kind of sleep? 
(“Apology for Raymond Sebond,” in The Complete Essays of Montaigne, trans. 
Donald M. Frame (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), 451)
Notice there is an implicit appeal, here, to something like AST: since in 
sleep it seems I am awake, perhaps my waking experiences are no more 
credible than my sleeping experiences.
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unreal presentations, whether depicted by the imagination, which we 
admit frequently to take place, or in slumber or under the influence 
of wine or o f insanity: we shall declare that all presentations o f this 
nature are devoid o f perspicuity, to which we are bound to cling tooth 
and nail. For who when feigning to himself an imaginary picture o f 
some object, the moment he bestirs himself and recalls his self-con­
sciousness does not at once perceive the difference between perspic­
uous presentations and unreal ones? The same applies to dreams. 
(Acad. II 51)39
Arcesilas, in turn, pressed the arguments showing “ that no presen­
tation proceeding from  a true object is such that a presentation 
proceeding from  a false one m ight not also be o f  the same fo rm ,” 
and, continues Cicero, “ this is the one argument that has held the 
fie ld  down to the present day”  (Acad. II 77-78) .40
As I hope to show, it is no coincidence that Descartes appeals to 
madness and dream ing in the First Meditation. In his Second Re­
plies, he informs us not only o f  his familiarity with the skeptical 
literature,41 but also that he views his own First Meditation argu­
ments as a rehash o f  the arguments o f  the Academics and Skeptics 
(A T  7:130); he adds, in the Th ird  Replies, that he “ was not trying 
to sell them as novelties”  (A T  7:171, CSM 2:121) .42
39Cf. also Acad. II 52-54.
40In their later sequel to the Academic-Stoic debate, Scotus took much 
the same position as the Stoics (in his response to Henry o f Ghent): Scotus 
denied that the experiences o f dreams and madness are in fact indistin­
guishable from waking experiences (Philosophical Writings, 118-19).
41And there is additional evidence, in his correspondence, o f a famil­
iarity with Cicero, Augustine, Montaigne, and others from the skeptical 
tradition. In his The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: 
University o f California Press, 1979), chap. 9, Richard H. Popkin discusses 
Descartes’s precursors from the skeptical tradition. See also Curley’s Des­
cartes Against the Skeptics, chap. 1, where he amplifies on a number o f strik­
ing parallels between Montaigne and Descartes.
4*M. F. Burnyeat, in “ Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes 
Saw and Berkeley Missed,” Philosophical Review 91 (1982): 3-40, has argued 
that no ancient skeptic worried that the whole totality o f our sensory per­
ceptions might be false (that idealism might be true and there might be 
no external world). Given the scope o f Cartesian doubt, says Burnyeat, if 
it is the result o f a “ rehash o f ancient skepticism, the implied claim is that 
the traditional material supports a doubt more radical than the traditional 
skeptic had dared suppose” (37). First, I should point out that in my re­
marks, thus far, I have made only the relatively weak claim that in Cicero 
we find ancient skeptics who appealed to madness and dreaming in order 
to generate a worry akin to UFD. But this is not (yet) the radical Cartesian 
doubt that Burnyeat has in mind, a doubt that carries with it the Cartesian
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4 . M adness and Dream ing: U nknow n Faculties in the 
First M editation
I want now to defend a reading o f  the First Meditation madness 
and dreaming passage according to which Descartes is proposing 
a skeptical argument, fo r UFD, similar to that presented by Cicero. 
And by establishing UFD, the argument serves as the initial ground 
o f  the m editator’s doubts concerning the Corporeal Existence The­
sis. I shall hereafter refer to the follow ing as the Unknown Faculty 
Argum ent:43
(A ST ) I f  some sensory experiences o f  kind X  are qualitatively 
indistinguishable from  those o f  kind Y, and I have rea­
son to suppose that those o f  kind X  are produced in 
an untrustworthy manner, then I have reason to worry 
that those o f  kind Y  may be produced in an equally 
untrustworthy manner.
view of the mind. Despite, however, that in my presentation thus far I am 
not at odds with Burnyeat, it seems to me that Burnyeat’s thesis is worth 
disputing. In his Contra Academicos (bk. Ill, chaps. 10-11), Augustine attri­
butes to Carneades a skepticism about the existence o f the world— a worry 
his Carneades raises on the basis o f a consideration o f madness and dream­
ing. In his rejoinder to Carneades, Augustine argues that we cannot doubt 
the existence o f the world so long as we limit ‘world’ to the scope o f 
appearances. Since, then (as Burnyeat concedes (28-29)), we find in Au­
gustine a notion o f the mental which is similar to that o f the later Descartes 
(one that turns on the subjectivity o f experience), it is not so obvious that 
the more radical “ Cartesian” doubt was a later invention. While there 
seems little doubt that Descartes’s use o f ‘idea’ is an innovation, the worry 
that we are trapped behind a veil o f mind-stuff or dream-stuff (whatever 
these turn out to be) seems not to be.
43Wilson (Descartes, 17ff.) has also noticed that the usual treatments o f 
the dreaming passage seem not to capture Descartes’s full intent, and the 
differences between my Unknown Faculty Argument and her interpreta­
tion o f the dreaming passage may appear to be only cosmetic. While I am 
motivated by many o f the same considerations that worry her, the differ­
ences between us are in fact substantial. First, on her reading the dreaming 
passage is not instrumental in raising doubts about the Corporeal Existence 
Thesis. Second, she does not read the madness passage nor the painter 
analogy as part o f the argument o f the dreaming passage. Third, she iden­
tifies no connection between the dreaming passage and (what I am calling) 
UFD. And fourth, she conflates (in both her First and Sixth Meditation 
treatments) what I take Descartes to intend as two distinct dream-related 
skeptical doubts. My own position on each o f these four counts emerges 
at various stages o f the present paper.
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(12) There are sensory experiences that I take to be non- 
veridical that are qualitatively indistinguishable from  
those that I take as normal and waking.
(13) The experiences in (12) that I take to be nonveridical 
may be produced by some unknown internal faculty 
(without any assistance from  external th ings).
(U FD ) I have reason to worry that the sensory experiences 
that I take as normal and waking are produced by 
some unknown, internal faculty (without any assis­
tance from  external things). [ (A S T ), (1 2 ),(1 3 )]
Before looking to the relevant First Meditation passages, I want 
to look briefly at other texts that suggest my Unknown Faculty 
Argument. First, consider that, while reiterating his earlier First 
Meditation doubts, the Sixth Meditation meditator says:
[E]very sensory experience I have ever thought I was having while 
awake I can also think o f myself as sometimes having while asleep; and 
since I do not believe that what I seem to perceive in sleep comes 
from things located outside me, I did not see why I should be any 
more inclined to believe this o f what I think I perceive while awake. 
(AT 7:77, CSM 2:53)
This just is the Unknown Faculty Argum ent with AST left implicit 
and (12) instantiated by the case o f  dreams. Second, notice that 
Hobbes, in the Th ird  Objections, reads the Unknown Faculty Ar­
gument into the First Meditation and supposes that it undermines 
the Corporeal Existence Thesis— neither move is protested by Des­
cartes:
From what is said in [the First] Meditation it is clear enough that there 
is no criterion enabling us to distinguish our dreams from the waking 
state and from veridical sensations. And hence the images we have 
when we are awake and having sensations are not accidents that inhere 
in external objects, and are no proof that any such external object 
exists at all. So if we follow our senses, without exercising our reason 
in any way, we shall be justified in doubting whether anything exists. 
(AT 7:171, CSM 2:121)
Third, the dream passages in the Discourse and in the Principles both
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suggest the Unknown Faculty Argument. In the Discourse, Descartes 
writes:
Lastly, considering that the very thoughts we have while awake may 
also occur while we sleep without any o f them being at the that [sic] 
time true, I resolved to pretend that all the things that had ever en­
tered my mind were no more true than the illusions o f my dreams.44 
(AT 6:32, CSM 1:127)
And in the Principles 1.4, Descartes infers that we have reason to 
doubt “ about the existence o f  the objects o f  sense-perception,” 
since “ in our sleep we regularly seem to have sensory perception 
of, or to imagine, countless things which do not exist anywhere; 
and . . . there seem to be no marks by means o f  which we can with 
certainty distinguish being asleep from  being awake” (A T  8a:5-6, 
CSM 1:194).
M oving on to the First Meditation dialectic itself,45 consider the 
first premise o f  the Unknown Faculty Argument. Descartes does 
not explicitly state AST in the First Meditation. But since it is not 
explicitly stated in any o f  the other texts just cited, this is hardly 
an objection to my reading.
As with the Academics, Descartes’s case for (12) is based on an 
appeal to madness and dreaming. H e begins with madness:
Yet although the senses occasionally deceive us with respect to ob­
jects which are very small or in the distance, there are many other 
beliefs about which doubt is quite impossible, even though they are 
derived from the senses—for example, that I am here, sitting by the 
fire, wearing a winter dressing-down, holding this piece o f paper in 
my hands, and so on. (Again, these hands, and my whole body— how 
can their existence be denied?)46 Unless perhaps I were to liken myself
44In the Discourse, the option o f supposing that the Corporeal Existence 
Thesis is called into question by the Deceiver Hypothesis is not available, 
since the Deceiver Hypothesis is never introduced.
45In my interpretation, I rely heavily on the view that in the Meditations, 
Descartes often advances his doctrines in dialectical fashion; cf. E. M. Cur­
ley, “Analysis in the Meditations:. The Quest for Clear and Distinct Ideas,” 
in Essays on Descartes Meditations, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley: University 
o f California Press, 1986), 157f. More specifically, I understand the First 
Meditation skeptical arguments to mature by means o f skeptical proposals 
followed by protests followed by rejoinders or revisions.
46I have relied on the Anscombe-Geach translation here (in the angle 
brackets). CSM render Manus vero has ipsas, totumque hoc corpus meurn esse,
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to madmen, whose brains are so damaged by the persistent vapours 
o f melancholia that they firmly maintain they are kings when they are 
paupers, or say they are dressed in purple when they are naked, or 
that their heads are made o f earthen ware, or that they are pumpkins, 
or made o f glass. But such people are insane, and I would be thought 
equally mad if I took anything from them as a model for myself. (AT 
7:18-19, CSM 2:13)
As typically read, the madness passage presents us with an inter­
pretive dilemma. According to the usual reading, Descartes is here 
proposing the worry that we m ight actually be mad. I f  so, then ei­
ther Descartes thinks he is dismissing the w orry in the brief, closing 
remark o f  this passage, or he does not (as the subsequent para­
graph can be read to suggest). I f  we suppose that Descartes intends 
to dismiss the worry here, his effort is deficient; given his proce­
dure o f  m ethodological doubt, Descartes owes us much m ore than 
the summary refutation here o ffe red .47 On the other hand, i f  we
qua ratione posset negari? as Again, how could it be denied that these hands 
or this whole body are mine?’ But the translation is strained. First, the 
singular meum is taken as the complement o f the plural ‘these hands and 
body’ rather than as the complement o f the singular ‘this body’ . Second, 
the context favors Anscombe-Geach. The meditator’s worry is not whether 
his body is his. None o f the examples suggest this. Moreover, the passage 
indicates that the worry initially raised by madness is renewed after con­
sideration o f dreaming. Yet dreaming is not typically taken as questioning 
whether our apparent bodies are ours. Nor does the conclusion drawn 
from the dreaming passage suggest that it is. Rather, the conclusion drawn 
suggests a worry about existence.
It is true that the French version supports the CSM translation: Et com­
ment est-ce que je pourrais nier que ces mains et ce corps soient a moi . . . ? But 
notice that at the end o f the dreaming passage nec forte etiam nos habere tales 
manus, nec tale totum corpus is rendered by the French version as et pensons 
que peut-etre nos mains ni tout notre corps ne sont pas tels que nous les voyons— 
again changing the worry from one about the existence o f objects to one 
about their nature. Burman, on the other hand, reports Descartes as saying 
o f the entire passage that it is “ dealing primarily with the question o f 
whether anything has real existence” (AT 5:146, CSMK 333). I am aware 
o f no decisive grounds for treating Burman as any more or less authori­
tative than the French version o f the Meditations.
47Anthony Kenny, in his Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy (New York: 
Random House, 1968), suggests that the madness worry is “ not pursued, 
possibly because it might seem offensive to the reader” (29). Wilson notes 
that the dismissal o f the madness worry is “ rather arbitrary” given that 
Descartes “ is prepared to doubt that he’s awake” (.Descartes, 23). And Harry 
Frankfurt, in Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1970), proposes that Descartes “ simply dismisses the possibility o f his own 
madness with the remark that it would not be reasonable for him to en-
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suppose that Descartes is not here dismissing the worry, then we 
are left with the problem  o f  understanding why he thinks the ob­
servation (in the subsequent paragraph) that we sometimes have 
crazy dreams is supposed to motivate the worry that we are insane.
This dilemma can be avoided, as the text supports an alternative 
reading. Rather than the worry that I m ight actually be mad, the 
worry is that for all I know my own sensory perception may be no 
more veracious, being on no better footing ,48 than that o f  the mad­
man. The assumption is that while madmen take their own sensory 
experience as normal and veridical— as do we— the rest o f  us o f 
know they are deranged, as Descartes’s examples convey: they per­
ceive themselves as “ dressed in purple when they are naked,” or 
even “ that they are pumpkins.” The aim o f the doubt is to make 
the meditator worry that his own sane world is no better connected 
with external reality than the madman’s world. And as such, the 
appeal to madness seems best thought o f  as the initial skeptical pro­
posal— intended to support (12) and (13 )— in the larger dialectic 
o f  the passage.
The meditator flippantly dismisses the comparison to the mad­
man, only to renew it promptly as the dialectic proceeds to a con­
sideration o f  dreams. A t first glance, the very suggestion that in­
sanity serves as a suitable benchmark fo r appraising his own sanity 
seems absurd. On second thought, however, the meditator notices 
that his own dream experiences are at least as bizarre as those he 
calls insane.
tertain it” (37). According to Frankfurt, in raising the problem of madness 
Descartes has raised a worry about reason itself. And, thinks Frankfurt, the 
meditator cannot but assume his own sanity, for “ if he were to begin by 
suspending the judgment that he is reasonable, he would be unable ever 
to reestablish his confidence in his own ability to carry out his task. For if 
he were to entertain doubts about his own rationality, he would naturally 
be bound to suspect any reasoning by which he might attempt to establish 
his sanity” (38). Granting Frankfurt’s reading, it should surprise us that 
Descartes reintroduces the worry about reason itself in conjunction with 
the Deceiver Hypothesis (as Frankfurt holds). Frankfurt’s eventual expla­
nation is that the meditator “ properly supposes himself free o f all defects 
or deficiencies that would render him less qualified than others to conduct 
the inquiry [as in madness]. But he does not, o f course, suppose that he 
is exempt from incapacities uniformly affecting all human minds [as suggested 
by the Deceiver Hypothesis]” (83, italics mine).
48nisi me forte comparem nescio quibus insanis . . . (AT 7:18).
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A brilliant piece o f reasoning! As if I were not a man who sleeps at 
night, and regularly has all the same experiences while asleep as mad­
men do when awake— indeed sometimes even more improbable ones. 
(AT 7:19, CSM 2:13)
Since the initial dismissal o f  the comparison to the madman was 
justified by appeal to the disparity between madness and sanity—  
they think “ they are pumpkins,” and the like— it is appropriate 
that the meditator sarcastically describes such dismissal as a brilliant 
piece o f reasoning subsequent to the observation that his own dream 
experiences are “ indeed sometimes even m ore im probable.”  
Though Descartes views the cases o f  madness and dream ing as 
having the same skeptical force— madness being in some sense the 
waking counterpart to dreaming49— he wisely presses dreaming as 
the paradigm case in support o f  ( 1 2 ) (focusing on it exclusively in 
his other less detailed treatments o f  the Unknown Faculty Argu­
m ent) .50 The appeal to dreams is m ore persuasive, as everyone has 
experienced a realistic dream.
49Cf. the Optics, where he explains that at the level o f physiology the 
(active) causal mechanism of each is largely the same (AT 6:141).
50An exception is The Search for Truth, where Descartes again raises the 
madness worry. Eudoxus (Descartes’s spokesperson) asks o f Polyander, 
have you
never seen one of those melancholic individuals who think themselves to be 
vases, or take some part of their body to be enormous; they will swear that what 
they see and touch is just as they imagine it to be. To be sure, a good man would 
be indignant if you told him that his beliefs cannot have any more rational basis 
than theirs, since he relies, like them, on what the senses and imagination rep 
resent to him. But you cannot take it amiss if I ask whether you are not, like all 
men, liable to fall asleep, and whether you cannot think, while asleep, that you 
are seeing me, that you are walking in this garden, that the sun is shining—in 
brief, all the things of which you now believe you are utterly certain. Have you 
never heard this expression of astonishment in comedies: ‘Am I awake or asleep?’ 
How can you be certain that your life is not a continuous dream, and that ev­
erything you think you learn through your senses is not false now, just as much 
as when you are asleep? (AT 10:511—12, CSM 2 :407- 8)
The similarities between this account and the reading I am offering o f the 
First Meditation are noteworthy. First, the worry here is not whether we are 
actually insane, but whether our sense perception might be no more reliable 
than that o f the insane. Second, the appeal to insanity is intended to support 
the same claim as the appeal to dreaming. Third, the appeal to insanity is 
not pursued since it is less persuasive than the case of dreaming. And fourth, 
the argument raises the worry that some unknown faculty or potentiality of 
the mind may produce waking experiences in the manner that dream ex­
periences are produced— it does so by implicit appeal to AST.
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The dialectic continues:
How often, asleep at night, am I convinced o f just such familiar events— 
that I am here in my dressing-gown, sitting by the fire—when in fact I 
am lying undressed in bed! Yet at the moment my eyes are certainly wide 
awake when I look at this piece o f paper; I shake my head and it is not 
asleep; as I stretch out and feel my hand I do so deliberately, and I know 
what I am doing. All this would not happen with such distinctness to 
someone asleep. Indeed! As if I did not remember other occasions when 
I have been tricked by exactly similar thoughts while asleep! As I think 
about this more carefully, I see plainly that there are never any sure signs 
by means o f which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep. 
The result is that I begin to feel dazed, and this very feeling only rein­
forces the notion that I may be asleep. (AT 7:19, CSM 2:13)
Both the fact and the manner o f  Descartes’s emphasis on (12) here 
seem best explained by the nature o f the historical debate. Recall that 
the Stoic (antiskeptical) strategy was to “ cling tooth and nail” to the 
claim that the presentations o f madness and dreams “ are devoid o f 
perspicuity,” and the response o f  the Academy was to stress “ that no 
presentation proceeding from a true object is such that a presentation 
proceeding from a false one might not also be o f the same form .” 
Historically, then, AST has not stood in need o f  justification; (12) has. 
For the same reasons the Academics emphasized the indistinguisha- 
bility claim, so does Descartes.51 Moreover, since the Stoic response 
to the Academy was to appeal to a lack o f perspicuity in nonveridical 
perception , Descartes focuses on exam ples which are typically 
thought o f as instances o f notably perspicuous perceptions— such as 
that I am presently seated by a fire, wearing a winter robe, holding 
a piece o f  paper in my hand, etc.52 While the naive empiricist will 
readily admit deception concerning the unperspicuous perception o f
51For an interesting account o f how Scotus and Ockham fare against 
the skeptical arguments o f the Academy, see Marilyn McCord Adams, Wil­
liam Ockham (Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1987), chap. 
14; see especially 578 and 591f. where she concludes o f both that they are 
specifically susceptible to the indistinguishability problem that my (12) 
brings out.
52Cf. G. E. Moore, in his ‘A  Defense o f Common Sense,” where he 
suggests that it is claims including precisely this sort— the location o f one’s 
body, what one is wearing, what one is holding in one’s hands, etc.—which 
constitute “ obvious truisms” that he “ know[s], with certainty, to be true” 
(Philosophical Papers (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 32-33).
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“ objects which are very small or in the distance,” he is not likely to 
concede this o f the close-up and familiar examples Descartes chooses. 
In effect, Descartes thinks he establishes that
(12 )' There are sensory experiences that I take to be nonver- 
idical that are qualitatively indistinguishable from  those 
that I take as my most perspicuous,
which, i f  accepted, would leave little doubt in his readers that ( 1 2 ) 
is the case.
Consider (13). On the basis o f  the dream ing passage, Descartes 
advances the dialectic by having his meditator say: “ Suppose then 
that I am dreaming, and that these particulars— that my eyes are 
open, that I am moving my head and stretching out my hands—  
are not true. Perhaps, indeed, I do not even have such hands or 
such a body at all”  (A T  7:19, CSM 2:13). This remark seems best 
understood as conveying the m editator’s initial suspicion (in the 
larger dialectic o f  the passage) that the Corporeal Existence Thesis 
is in doubt, even though the remark does not strictly entail it. It is 
suggestive that in The Search fo r Truth, a similar remark (in the 
context o f  a consideration o f  dreams) does in fact signal the worry 
about the Corporeal Existence Thesis:
I shall apply my mind to the task o f doubting whether I have not been 
dreaming all my life, and whether all the ideas I thought capable o f 
entering my mind only by way o f the senses were not in fact formed 
by themselves, just as similar ideas are formed whenever I am asleep, 
and I know that my eyes are shut, my ears closed, and in short, that 
none o f my senses help to form them. Thus I  shall be uncertain not only 
about whether you are in the world and whether there is an earth or a sun; 
but also about whether I  have eyes, ears, a body, and even whether I  am 
speaking to you and you are speaking to me. In short, I shall doubt every­
thing. (AT 10:514, CSM 2:409; italics mine)
Also, in connection with (13), it is worth rehashing the m editator’s 
Th ird  Meditation testimonial, since it lends support to reading 
(13) into the First Meditation account:
There may be some other faculty not yet fully known to me, which 
produces these ideas without any assistance from external things; this
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is, after all, just how I  have always thought ideas are produced in me 
when I am dreaming.53 (AT 7:39, CSM 2:27; italics mine)
(13) does not, however, go unchallenged. W hile the untutored 
man o f  comm on sense may hold to this causal story o f  dreams, the 
same cannot be said o f  the Aristotelian. And so, as the First M ed­
itation dialectic advances to its next step (the painter analogy), 
Descartes expounds the likely objection to (13) in order to rebut it.
Aristotelians generally held o f  sense images, whether those o f  
waking sensation or those o f  dreams, that they are all traceable to 
real, external objects.54 As Thomas writes, “ The source o f  the imag­
53What counts as external, and for whom, are difficult historical problems. 
While it is clear that, for Descartes, the external world includes even the 
meditator’s body, it is not so clear how to understand the pre-Cartesian med­
itator’s view, and his account here o f dreams is problematic. Since by this stage 
o f the Third Meditation the meditator is surely in step with the Cartesian view 
o f externality, I suggest we take the meditator to be saying here that he has 
always thought that dream-stuff (whatever that turns out to be) is produced 
solely by means o f mind-stuff (whatever that turns out to be).
Note also that ‘any’ in ‘without any assistance from external things’ 
[absque ulla rerum externarum ope] underscores an occasionally bothersome 
problem in the Meditations, that o f voice. Is the meditator intended to 
represent the Aristotelian or the untutored man o f common sense— or 
both? It is, after all, false o f Aristotelians that they have always thought that 
the causal story behind dreams excludes any reference whatever to exter­
nal, corporeal things. And in the passage just cited, from The Search for 
Truth, the speaker’s remark that all his ideas might be “ formed by them­
selves, just as similar ideas are formed whenever [he is] asleep,” is equally 
unAristotelian. Interestingly, in The Search for Truth Descartes uses two char­
acters, Epistemon and Polyander (an Aristotelian and a common man, 
respectively), in order to express the views that in the Meditations are ex­
pressed in the single voice o f the meditator. Predictably, it is Polyander 
who endorses the above causal story o f dreams. Perhaps less expected is 
that the meditator’s First Meditation claim that “whatever [he has] up till 
now accepted as most true [he has] acquired either from the senses or 
through the senses” (AT 7:18, CSM 2:12) need not tag him as Aristotelian: 
in the The Search for Truth, the very same tenet is attributed to Polyander 
(AT 10:510, cf. also 10:512)— Descartes, in fact, holds that everyone suffers 
from a preoccupation with the senses (cf. Principles 1.71). Since in other 
texts, such as the painter analogy (which we are about to consider), the 
meditator is surely speaking on behalf o f the Aristotelian, it is perhaps best 
to understand the meditator’s pre-Cartesian persona as schizophrenically 
vacillating between a schoolman and a commoner.
54On this account, the sensible forms o f the external objects o f waking 
sensation affect the senses in a manner that Aristotle likened to a signet- 
ring leaving its impress on a piece o f wax (De Anima 11.12 424a), a process 
thought to guarantee veridicality (cf. De Anima III.3 427b-428a). These 
affections o f waking sensation on the organs o f sense were believed to
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ination lies in the activity o f  the senses, fo r we cannot imagine what 
we have never perceived by the senses either wholly or in part. ” 55 
Thus, the phantasms occurring in dreams are the residual effect 
o f  veridical, waking sensation. And we should expect the Aristote­
lian to object to (13) on precisely these grounds: even in dreams, 
the ultimate source o f  the images in our sensory ideas lies with 
external, corporeal matter.
As a means o f  addressing this objection, Descartes offers an anal­
ogy between the images occurring in dreams and those on the 
painter’s canvas.56 The analogy is presented in two phases: in the 
first phase Descartes expresses the anticipated objection to (13), 
and in the second he offers a rebuttal. The first phase proceeds as 
follows:
Suppose then that I am dreaming, and that these particulars— that my 
eyes are open, that I am moving my head and stretching out my 
hands— are not true. Perhaps, indeed, I do not even have such hands 
or such a body at all. Nonetheless, it must surely be admitted that the 
visions which come in sleep are like paintings, which must have been 
fashioned in the likeness [similitudinem] o f things that are real, and 
hence that at least these general kinds o f things— eyes, head, hands 
and the body as a whole— are things which are not imaginary but are 
real and exist. For even when painters try to create sirens and satyrs 
with the most extraordinary bodies, they cannot give them natures 
which are new in all respects; they simply jumble up the limbs o f 
different animals. (AT 7:19-20, CSM 2:13)
In effect, the criticism is that the creative talents o f  the m ind in­
clude renovation but not innovation. The imagination is capable 
o f  creating sirens and satyrs in sleep, but the raw materials fo r such 
artistry must trace to previous veridical sensation. In short, there 
must have been interaction between the senses and external ob­
jects or else our ideas o f  such objects are inexplicable.
Descartes’s strategy fo r convincing the Aristotelian to adopt (13)
remain even after sensation terminated (De Somniis II 459a), thereby allow­
ing the imagination to produce phantasms in sleep. Since, in this context, 
‘external’ means external to the organs o f sense, this surely counts as ex­
ternal in the Cartesian sense.
55Summa Theologica, la.111.3.
56In my own understanding o f the painter analogy passage, I have ben­
efited from an unpublished paper by John Carriero, “ Painting and Dream­
ing in the First Meditation.”
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reflects the general m ethod o f  doubt em ployed in the Meditations, 
a m ethod whose ground rules are explained in the First Medita­
tion:
Reason now leads me to think that I should hold back my assent from 
opinions which are not completely certain and indubitable just as care­
fully as I do from those which are patently false. So, for the purpose 
o f rejecting all my opinions, it will be enough if I find in each o f them 
at least some reason for doubt. (AT 7:18, CSM 2:12)
Accordingly, fantastic hypotheses are adopted (such as the Deceiv­
er Hypothesis), no matter how epistemologically disastrous, so long 
as they are at least prima facie possible. The rigorous brand o f 
knowledge Descartes is seeking in the Meditations moves the bur­
den o f  responsibility from  the skeptic’s corner to that o f  the person 
claim ing to have true knowledge. Thus, in his defense o f  (13), 
Descartes needs only to establish the relatively weak claim that the 
nativist account cannot be ruled out; indeed, “ there may be reasons 
which are strong enough to com pel us to doubt, even though these 
reasons are themselves doubtful”  (A T  7:473, CSM 2:319).
In keeping with this strategy, Descartes advances the dialectic, in 
the second phase o f  the painter analogy, by o ffering a fully nativist 
account as a possible alternative to the Aristotelian account pre­
sented in the first phase:
Or if perhaps [the painters] manage to think up something so new 
that nothing remotely similar has ever been seen before— something 
which is therefore completely fictitious and unreal— at least the col­
ours used in the composition must be real. By similar reasoning, al­
though these general kinds o f things— eyes, head, hands and so on— 
could be imaginary, it must at least be admitted that certain other 
even simpler and more universal things are real. These are as it were 
the real colours from which we form all the images o f things, whether 
true or false, that occur in our thought. (AT 7:20, CSM 2:13-14)
Just as the painter need not fashion the images on her canvas after 
anything real and existing, perhaps also my own sensory ideas are 
not fashioned after anything external to my mind. Perhaps things 
like eyes, heads, and hands (and with them all organs o f  sense) 
are imaginary and nonexistent. But i f  I have no body and no sens­
es, what is the origin o f  the varied and com plex sensory images I
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experience? Descartes’s answer lies in the analogy. Since the paint­
er needs nothing m ore than her simple colors as basic building 
blocks from  which to compose m ore com plex images, so perhaps 
the mind needs nothing m ore than simple and universal57 ingre­
dients from  which to compose the com plex ideas o f  sensible ob­
jects .58 The dissociation o f  the meditator from  his own body (sug­
gested here in the second phase o f  the analogy) seems a 
particularly apt way o f  suggesting the real possibility that our sen­
sory ideas are generated by an internal faculty. The Aristotelian 
has no decisive grounds fo r excluding the nativist account, and in 
the context o f  hyperbolic doubt this is all that is needed fo r (13).
The upshot o f  the Unknown Faculty Argum ent is a skepticism 
about the existence o f  the external, corporeal world: the im m edi­
ate conclusion o f  the argument is UFD, and UFD, as we have seen, 
motivates the m ore general worry about the Corporeal Existence 
Thesis. Thus, as the First Meditation dialectic continues, the m ed­
itator concludes that “ physics, astronomy, medicine, and all other 
disciplines which depend on the study o f  composite things, are
57The well-known medieval debate over the nature o f universals not­
withstanding, all Aristotelians would have agreed that universals are objects 
o f thought rather than o f the senses.
58The meditator proposes that the list o f such simple ideas “ appears to 
include corporeal nature in general, and its extension; the shape o f ex­
tended things; the quantity, or size and number o f these things; the place 
in which they may exist, the time through which they may endure, and so 
on” (AT 7:20, CSM 2:14; italics mine). It is not uncommon for commen­
tators to try to read this list in light o f the Cartesian doctrine concerning 
simple natures; cf., for instance, Jean-Luc Marion, “ Cartesian Metaphysics: 
The Simple Nature,” in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cot- 
tingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). But such read­
ings seem implausible given that the meditator is under hyperbolic doubt: 
At this stage o f the Meditations, Descartes has no right to advance any 
doctrines (not to mention Cartesian doctrines) that are not related to the 
procedure o f doubt— especially given, as we have seen, that the meditator 
confesses to being an empiricist o f some sort rather than a Cartesian. In 
conversation, Calvin Normore has suggested what seems to me a plausible 
account o f this list, namely, that it would have likely been taken by Des­
cartes’s Aristotelian readers to be an elliptical list o f Aristotle’s ten cate­
gories (substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, condi­
tion, action, and passion). This suggestion complements my own reading 
o f the passage, since the categories are, for an Aristotelian, the basic build­
ing blocks for our conceptual organization o f the world; granting the pos­
sibility o f the nativist account, the categories would be as a color wheel 
from which some mental faculty might paint the myriad images o f material 
things.
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doubtful”  (A T  7:20, CSM 2:14). On my reading, they are doubtful 
because the proper objects o f  the claims made in such disciplines 
are the externally existing, material composites that have now been 
called into question .59 Whereas
arithmetic, geometry and other subjects o f this kind, which deal only 
with the simplest and most general things, regardless o f whether they 
really exist in nature or not, contain something certain and indubi­
table. For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three added together 
are five, and a square has no more than four sides. (AT 7:20, CSM 2: 
14)
The proper objects o f  the claims in arithmetic and geom etry are 
not the composite particulars that UFD has questioned; as such, 
they are not yet in doubt60— a temporary circumstance with the 
Deceiver Hypothesis on deck.
To conclude my case fo r reading the Unknown Faculty Argu­
ment into the madness and dreaming passage, I want to consider 
a likely objection to my account. Since my reading results in the 
Corporeal Existence Thesis being called into doubt prior to the 
passage introducing the Deceiver Hypothesis, it seems not to 
square with the latter text:61
And yet firmly rooted in my mind is the long-standing opinion that 
there is an omnipotent God who made me the kind o f creature that 
I am. How do I know that he has not brought it about that there is
59According to Aristotelian hylomorphic theory, material objects are 
composites o f matter and form, and the knowledge claims from the natural 
sciences, such as Descartes here mentions, refer to these composite sensi­
ble particulars. Says Ockham, “ the philosophy o f nature deals primarily 
with sensible substances composed o f matter and form” — their proposi­
tions stand for real (external and composite) things (Philosophical Writings, 
trans. Philotheus Boehner (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1990), 11).
60Aristotelians held that by means o f abstraction the objects o f mathe­
matics can be understood apart from sensible matter (cf. Post Anal. 81b, 
De Anima III.7 431b, and Thomas’s Commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate q. 
5). Adds Ockham, concerning the science o f logic, as opposed to the other 
sciences, its claims refer to mental contents rather than real, material 
things (Philosophical Writings, 12).
6Mi;f. Wilson, who cites this as support for the standard interpretation 
that the Corporeal Existence Thesis is initially called into doubt only by 
the Deceiver Hypothesis (see note 2 above).
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no earth, no sky, no extended thing, no shape, no size, no place, while 
at the same time ensuring that all these things appear to me to exist 
just as they do now? (AT 7:21, CSM 2:14)
But the objection is flawed. This text does not show that the 
Corporeal Existence Thesis is initially underm ined by the Deceiver 
Hypothesis; it shows merely that the Deceiver Hypothesis does un­
derm ine it. But this is compatible with the view that the list o f  
things here called into question by the Deceiver have already been 
questioned. On my view, the Deceiver Hypothesis is intended to 
bolster the previous doubts, those already raised by the weaker 
skeptical arguments, as well as introduce new ones .62 For all the 
meditator knows (com e the end o f  the First M editation), the un­
known faculty actively causing his sensory ideas m ight be a faculty 
o f  his own mind— as with UFD— or it m ight be G od63 (cf. A T  7: 
22-23). Either supposition results in a skepticism o f the Corporeal 
Existence Thesis. And, as we have seen, the (three-stage) Sixth 
Meditation argument rules out both: the possibility o f  an unknown 
internal faculty as the active cause is elim inated by introspection, 
and the possibility that God is the active cause is ruled out in the 
third stage o f  the argument.
5 . T h e  D ream ing A rgum ent vis-a-vis the U nknow n 
Faculty Argum ent
Historically, there are two distinct dream-related skeptical prob­
lems: (i) the worry that I m ight now be asleep, since some expe­
62In The Search for Truth, Descartes uses the Deceiver Hypothesis in pre­
cisely this way. He has Eudoxus say, how do you know “ that everything you 
think you learn through your senses is not false now, just as much as when 
you are asleep? In particular, how can you be certain o f this when you have 
learned that you were created by a superior being who, being all-powerful, 
would have found it no more difficult to create us just as I am describing, 
than to create us as you think you are?” (AT 10:511—12, CSM 2:408)
63Interestingly, in what is perhaps the earliest known historical antece­
dent o f the Deceiver Hypothesis, Cicero reports that one o f the issues 
disputed by the Academics and the Stoics was the possibility o f dreams sent 
by a deity who had the power to make nonveridical perception appear ve­
ridical (Acad. II 47). (Cf. Curley, Descartes Against the Skeptics, 68-69.) And 
in what may be a fourteenth-century antecedent, John Buridan and Nich­
olas o f Autrecourt argued over whether an all-powerful God could deceive 
us by bringing it about that an even clearer perception than that produced 
in genuine intuitive cognition (the scholastic counterpart to the Stoic cog­
nitive impressions) would occur in the nonveridical perceptions o f dreams 
(see Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, bk. II, q .l).
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riences I take as dreams are qualitatively indistinguishable from  
others I take as waking (a problem  that dates back to at least as 
early as P lato ’s Theaetetus); and (ii) the worry that even i f  I am 
awake my experience may be no m ore veracious than when I am 
asleep, since I may have an unknown faculty that produces waking 
states in a manner similar to the way dream states are produced 
(a problem  I have traced back as far as the Academ ics). The two 
problems are not redundant, though both are parasitic on the 
same qualitative indistinguishability problem. The problem  in ( i )—  
often elaborated as the Dream ing Argum ent— raises the universal 
possibility o f delusion: any one o f  my sensory experiences m ight be 
nonveridical, and the attending sensory judgm ent false, since I 
m ight at that m om ent be dreaming. The problem  in ( i i )— which 
I have referred to as UFD— raises the possibility of universal delusion: 
it m ight be that all my sensory experiences are delusions, from  a 
G od ’s-eye point o f  view .64
My proposal that we read UFD into the madness and dreaming 
passage ought not to be viewed as incompatible with holding that 
some Dream ing Argum ent such as (i) occurs in the very same 
passage. N o t only have I nowhere questioned the occurrence o f  
(i );  the problem  in (ii) on which I have focused is generated, in 
part, because o f  the indistinguishability problem  in ( i )— a problem  
that is introduced in the First Meditation.
Because o f  the differences in (i) and (ii), they are dismissed in 
separate Sixth Meditation arguments. Having elim inated (ii) in the 
p roo f o f  the Corporeal Existence Thesis, the problem  in (i) re­
mains in force, since premise (12) o f  the Unknown Faculty Argu­
ment stands unchallenged ;65 dreams continue to be, in some cases,
64Though worries such as (i) and (ii) inspire charges that Cartesian 
doubt is incoherent (cf. O. K. Bouwsma’s “ Descartes’ Evil Genius,” Philo­
sophical Review 58 (1949): 141-51), Descartes was in fact mindful o f prob­
lems o f verifiability and meaningfulness such as have troubled recent phi­
losophers. For instance, in the Second Replies (AT 7:143-45), while 
responding to an objection that it is possible that God might be, in some 
absolute sense, a deceiver in spite o f what reason shows, Descartes dismisses 
the worry since there are no conceivable grounds by which our belief in 
God’s benevolence could be corrected. In effect, he dismisses the objection 
as a pseudoproblem: it is “ no objection for someone to make out that [our 
most certain] truths might appear false to God or to an angel,” and we 
need not “ listen to anyone who makes up this kind o f story” (AT 7:146, 
CSM 2:104). For Descartes, the problems in (i) and (ii) are meaningful, 
precisely because we do have the capacity to solve them.
65The ongoing worry in ( i ) , however, does not undermine the credibility
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qualitatively indistinguishable from  (what are taken as) normal, 
waking experiences. It is not until the very end o f  the Sixth M ed­
itation that Descartes finally attempts a refutation o f  ( i ) .66 The Un­
known Faculty A rgum ent fails not because o f  (12), but because o f
(13): the m editator’s prereflective view— that in dreams his sensory 
ideas are produced without any assistance from external things— is shown 
to be false; whether awake or asleep, the active cause o f  involuntary 
sensory ideas is external, corporeal substance. It has not been 
shown, however, that the passive causes o f  such ideas are corporeal, 
and this leaves room  fo r Cartesian nativism .67
6. Conclusion
Recall that according to the standard interpretation Descartes’s 
treatment o f  the Corporeal Existence Thesis turns entirely on the 
Deceiver Hypothesis: doubts about the thesis are initially raised (in 
the First Meditation) upon introduction o f  the Deceiver, and the 
thesis is reaffirm ed (in the Sixth M editation) by a straightforward 
appeal to knowledge o f  God as no deceiver. I have challenged this 
interpretation, arguing instead that Descartes’s treatment o f  the 
Corporeal Existence Thesis centers on UFD: doubts about the the­
sis are initially raised (in the First M editation) in the madness and 
dreaming passage, and the thesis is reaffirm ed (in the Sixth M ed­
itation) by a three-stage argument in which a partial (but sufficient­
ly strong) refutation o f  UFD by introspection is an essential step.
Descartes’s treatment o f  UFD fits neatly into the epistemological 
machinery o f  the Meditations; it adds a cog to the orderly progres­
o f the proof intended to refute (ii ) . Having argued for the existence o f a 
God who guarantees the veracity o f clear and distinct perception under all 
circumstances, the Fifth Meditation meditator observes: “ For even though
I might be dreaming, if there is anything which is evident to my intellect, 
then it is wholly true” (AT 7:71, CSM 2:49).
66In “ Cartesian Theodicy and the Criterion o f Truth” I show that the 
Dreaming Argument is refuted not by challenging the indistinguishability 
claim in (12), but by appeal to elements o f the theodicy earlier expounded 
in the Fourth Meditation (cf. note 25).
67Recall that in establishing the External Cause Thesis, the Sixth Med­
itation argument rules out UFD only to the extent that active unknown 
mental faculties are eliminated. And while this is inconsistent with (13) as 
stated, some weaker version o f (13)— one that allows that the active causes 
o f sensory ideas are corporeal— remains unchallenged.
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sion o f  First Meditation doubt that complements that existing in 
the orderly unfolding o f  knowledge in the later Meditations. W ith 
the addition o f  UFD, the skeptical dialectic o f  the First Meditation 
progresses as follows: doubts that underm ine sensory judgm ents 
concerning the nature o f  small and distant objects leave intact 
judgm ents concerning the existence o f  large and close objects such 
as “ these hands, and my whole body” ; the Dream ing Argum ent 
then questions the existence o f  all the objects o f  any particular 
sensory experience, while leaving intact the judgm ent that some 
such objects exist; UFD then undermines the latter, though it re­
mains the case that “ two and three added together are five, and a 
square has no m ore than four sides,”  and the like; finally, the rad­
ical skepticism induced by the Deceiver Hypothesis calls into doubt 
even the truths o f  mathematics. In the epistemologically construc­
tive Meditations, Descartes rebuts these same skeptical arguments 
in reverse order, though doubts about the determinate modes o f  
corporeal objects never are dismissed.
The concern with unknown faculties in the Meditations figures 
in Descartes’s larger concerns with the new science— though it has 
not here been my aim to argue this. Though the full-blown nativ- 
ism that initially results from  UFD is adopted solely because o f  its 
skeptical force, it nonetheless foreshadows Descartes’s own miti­
gated version o f  nativism. Descartes’s strategy is to begin with a 
radical skepticism o f the senses and then recover knowledge only 
o f  what comports with fully mechanical explanation. UFD calls into 
question whether there even is an external, corporeal world— and 
with it, all o f  Aristotelian science. Descartes then reinstates our 
knowledge o f  the corporeal world, but the world that emerges 
from  the residue o f  unresolved First Meditation doubt is conceived 
with an entirely new nature and an attenuated causal role in the 
production o f  sensory ideas: the conception o f  body that emerges 
is one stripped o f  all but the quantitative features amenable to 
mechanical explanation ,68 and one whose causal role in sensation
68As for the qualitative features from the old conception o f body, such 
as “ that the heat in a body is something exactly resembling the idea o f 
heat which is in me; or that when a body is white or green, the selfsame 
whiteness or greenness which I perceive through my senses is present in 
the body; or that in a body which is bitter or sweet there is the selfsame 
taste which I experience, and so on” (AT 7:82, CSM 2:56-57), the First 
Meditation doubts that undermine the judgment that such features really 
exist in bodies never are resolved. The Sixth Meditation meditator con­
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is lim ited to that o f an active cause. Thus, the meditator qualifies 
the conclusion o f  his Sixth Meditation p roo f fo r the Corporeal 
Existence Thesis by observing that the corporeal substances caus­
ing his sensory ideas “ may not all exist in a way that exactly cor­
responds with [his] sensory grasp o f  them ” (A T  7:80, CSM 2:55); 
he does so, since he has not yet ruled out the possibility that he is 
asleep, and since to the extent that UFD remains unresolved, it 
leaves in doubt whether there is any resemblance between corpo­
real objects as perceived and corporeal objects in themselves. In 
keeping with the new mechanical science, it is false that our ideas 
resemble69 the corporeal motions that occasion them ,70 and Des­
cartes reinforces the nonqualitative conception o f  corporeal sub­
stance in expounding elements o f  his own theory o f  innateness in 
the Second Meditation discussion o f  the wax (A T  7:30-31) and in 
the Fifth Meditation discussion o f  true and immutable natures (A T  
7:63-64).71 By moving the nonquantitative features o f  sensation 
from  the domain o f  the corporeal to the innate domain o f  the 
mental, the path is cleared fo r a fully mechanical science.
UFD is unique am ong the First M editation skeptical arguments 
in that Descartes’s proposed solution is, in large part, one that 
need not invoke the theological baggage o f  the Meditations. The 
Cartesian distinction between the internal and the external— the 
internal world consisting o f  all and only the events concern ing 
which we have (o r  potentially have) imm ediate awareness— has 
relevance apart from  substance dualism. And granting the dis­
tinction in these terms, the second stage— (2 ) ' thru ( 6 ) — o f  Des-
cludes: “Although I feel heat when I go near a fire and feel pain when I 
go too near, there is no convincing argument for supposing that there is 
something in the fire which resembles the heat, any more than for sup­
posing that there is something which resembles the pain. There is simply 
reason to suppose that there is something in the fire, whatever it may 
eventually turn out to be, which produces in us the feelings o f heat or 
pain” (AT 7:83, CSM 2:57).
69Except insofar as they have some determinable size, shape, motion, 
or other quantifiable features.
70Cf. Principles 1.71, II.4, and IV.197-98; and AT 7:81-82, 7:381-82, and 
8b:359.
71In his unpublished “ Descartes on the Innate Idea o f Body,” Alan Nel­
son elaborates on this claim in his treatment o f Descartes’s theory o f in­
nateness, a treatment from which I have benefited.
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cartes’s Sixth M editation argum ent is an interesting contender fo r 
establishing the existence o f  an external world (never m ind its 
nature).
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